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ROCKY MOUNTAIN ENERGY CO., 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, ] 
Respondent/Appellee. ; 
i Case No. 910105 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1990) and § 78-2-
2(3)(e)(ii) (1990). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
I. Whether the oral agreement permitting L.A. Young 
Construction Company ("L.A. Young") to remove tangible personal 
property in the form of slag material from Rocky Mountain Energy 
Company's ("RME") leasehold estate is a taxable transaction 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a)(1987 & Supp. 1991). 
II. Whether Rocky Mountain Energy Company's ("RME") 
sale of tangible personal property to L.A. Young is an exempt 
transaction as a sale to the State since RME negotiated with L.A. 
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Young for payment to be made by Utah Department of Transportation 
("UDOT") checks jointly payable to L.A. Young and RME. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This Court's standard of review for both issues is Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)(1990). Pursuant to § 63-46b-
16(4)(d)(1990) this Court can grant relief if, on the basis of 
the agency's record, it determines that RME has been 
substantially prejudiced by an erroneous interpretation or 
application of the law by the Tax Commission- Thus the 
"correction of error" standard is applicable to the issues 
presented by this appeal. Chris & Dicks Lumber and Hardware v. 
Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511 (Utah 1990). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a)(1987 & Supp. 1991): 
(1) There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the 
amount paid or charged for the following: 
(a) retail sales of tcingible personal property 
made within the state; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13)(1987 & Supp. 1991): 
(a) "Tangible personal property" means: 
• * * * 
(iv) all other physically existing articles or 
things, including property severed from real 
estate. 
(b) "Tangible personal property" does not include: 
(i) real estate or any interest therein or 
improvements thereon; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-104(2)(1987 & Supp. 1991): 
The following sales and uses are exempt from the taxes 
imposed by this chapter: 
• * * * 
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(2) sales to the state, its institutions, and its 
political subdivisions; 
Utah Admin- Code R865-19-42S (1991): 
1A. Sales made to the state of Utah, its departments 
and institutions or to its political subdivisions such 
as counties, municipalities, school districts, drainage 
districts, irrigation districts, and metropolitan water 
districts are exempt from tax if such property [is] for 
use in the exercise of an essential governmental 
function. If the sale is paid for by a warrant drawn 
upon the state treasurer or the official disbursing 
agent of any political subdivision, the sale is 
considered as being made to the state of Utah or its 
political subdivisions and exempt from tax. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves an appeal from the Tax Commission's 
Order issued from its Formal Hearing on February 13, 1991. At 
issue before the Tax Commission was whether RME was required to 
remit sales tax on its sale of slag material to L.A. Young. 
RME's contention before the Tax Commission was that 
this transaction involved the conveyance of an interest in land, 
and was thus exempt from sales tax. The Tax Commission 
disagreed, and held that "[t]here was no evidence presented by 
the Petitioner which would substantiate the Petitioner's claim 
that the parties to the contract intended the purchase agreement 
to constitute the sale of an interest in real property rather 
than the sale of the slag material as tangible personal 
property." (R. 23.) (Addendum A attached). 
RME's second argument before the Tax Commission was 
that these transactions should be exempt because it received 
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payment by way of a two-party check issued by UDOT to L.A. Young 
and RME as co-payees. The Tax Commission rejected this argument 
and held that the manner of payment required by RME did not 
change the transaction to one wherein RME sold the slag material 
to the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The following facts were stipulated or established by 
testimony at the hearing before the Tax Commission. 
1. RME leased from Kennecott Corporation ("Kennecott") 
the slag pile. (R. 69.) 
2. L.A. Young, in bidding on a UDOT highway project, 
contacted RME for price quotes on the sale of slag material. (R. 
69.) 
3. RME offered L.A. Young two options in which to 
purchase the slag. Either RME would remove the material from the 
slag pile for L.A. Young at a fixed price, or L.A. Young could 
use its own equipment and remove* the slag material itself in 
which case L.A. Young would pay RME $ .60 per ton. (R. 69-70.) 
4. L.A. Young was the successful bidder on the UDOT 
project, and elected to remove the material itself from RME's 
slag pile. (R. 69.) 
5. L.A. Young obtained from Kennecott a written 
easement which granted L.A. Young access across Kennecott's 
property to RME's slag pile. (R. 103-107.) 
6. RME and L.A. Young had an oral agreement which gave 
-.4-
L.A. Young permission to remove slag from RME's leasehold estate. 
None of RME's agreement with L.A. Young was put in writing. (R. 
39, 47.) 
7. During the negotiations between RME and L.A. Young, 
RME insisted that L.A. Young make arrangements with UDOT so that 
RME would receive payment for the material from UDOT rather than 
L.A. Young. (R. 70.) 
8. This manner of payment was accepted by all three 
parties. Throughout the project UDOT issued checks payable to 
both L.A. Young and RME. UDOT would give these checks to its 
contractor, L.A. Young, who would in turn endorse the checks and 
give the checks to RME in payment for the slag material removed 
by L.A. Young. (R. 70.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Tax Commission correctly held that RME's sale of 
slag material to L.A. Young involved the sale of tangible 
personal property and as such was properly assessed a sales tax 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-103(1)(a)(1987 & Supp. 1991). 
The sale transactions did not involve a transfer of a 
nontaxable interest in land as RME contends. There was no 
written agreement between the parties to transfer an interest in 
real property. The proper characterization of this transaction 
is a license granted to L.A. Young to remove the slag material. 
"A license is an authority or permission to do a particular act 
or series of acts upon the land of another without possessing any 
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interest or estate in such land." Tanner Companies, v. Arizona 
State Land Dep't., 688 P.2d 1075, 1085 (Ariz. App. 1984). 
Further, the sale of slag material was a sale of 
tangible personal property by the mere fact that the slag 
material which L.A. Young had permission to remove was material 
which had previously been severed from realty through the mining 
processes. This slag material was, therefore, tangible personal 
property even before L.A. Young loaded the material onto its 
trucks. Thus to characterize this transaction as RME selling 
L.A. Young an interest in land is incorrect. 
RME's sale of material to L.A. Young is not exempt from 
taxation merely because UDOT paid for the material by means of 
two-party checks payable to L.A. Young and RME. The substance of 
the transaction over the form must be considered here. RME 
insisted upon payment in this manner because of L.A. Young's 
precarious financial position. RME negotiated only with L.A. 
Young and had no dealings with UDOT. The sole fact that RME 
received payment by means of a state warrant under these 
circumstances does not alter the fact that this was a sales 
transaction between RME and L.A. Young only. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE SALE OF SLAG MATERIAL FROM 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN ENERGY TO L.A. YOUNG 
DID NOT INVOLVE A CONVEYANCE OF AN 
INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY 
RME's contention that the transactions between itself 
and L.A. Young involved a transfer of an interest in real 
property is without merit. RME claims its sale of slag material 
is a nontaxable transaction since Utah's sales tax is applied 
only on transactions of tangible personal property. RME relies 
upon Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-102(13)(b)(1987 & Supp. 1991) which 
states, "Tangible personal property' does not include: (i) real 
estate or any interest therein or improvements thereon; . . . ." 
RME contends that a label on the transferred interest 
is not important in finding the transaction between RME and L.A. 
Young as nontaxable. While a conveyance of an interest in land 
is not a taxable event, it is necessary, when an alleged interest 
is at issue, to see if there was a conveyance, and if so what 
type of interest was transferred. Therefore, to properly analyze 
these transactions under § 59-12-102(13)(b)(1987 & Supp. 1991) it 
is necessary to label the interest, if any, RME conveyed to L.A. 
Young. For instance, if RME had deeded property to L.A. Young, 
or granted L.A. Young a lease, easement, or a profit a prendre, 
there would have been a transfer of an interest in land, and thus 
no sales tax assessed against RME. However, the record does not 
reflect facts which support a transfer of these types of 
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interests in land. 
The Tax Commission was correct in labeling the 
permission RME gave to L.A. Young as a license. A distinction 
between a license and an interest in land was made in Radke v. 
Union Pac. R.R. Co., 334 P.2d 1077 (Colo. 1959), 
While under a lease an interest or estate in the land 
itself is created, under a license a licensee has no 
interest or estate in the land itself, but only in the 
proceeds, . . . not as realty, but as personal 
property/ . . . . In general, a contract simply giving 
a right to take ore from a mine, no interest or estate 
being granted, confers a mere license . . . 
Id. at 1086 (citing Saxman v. Christmann, 79 P.2d 520, 521 (Ariz. 
1938), (emphasis added). 
This language from Radke is highly relevant to the case 
at bar. In the present case, L.A. Young only had RME's 
permission to load slag onto its own trucks; in return L.A. 
Young was required to pay RME $.60 per ton. RME did not grant 
any specific interest in land to L.A. Young. RME was unable to 
produce any written documentation to support its claim that an 
interest in land was granted. Rather RME and L.A. Young had only 
an oral agreement which allowed the latter to remove slag from 
RME's stockpile.1 
The theory behind the Tax Commission's holding is 
1
 Counsel for RME admitted that there was no written 
agreement between the parties by stating, "there is nc formal 
written agreement, to the best of my knowledge, between R.M.E. 
and L.A. Young. It was more or less just an understanding." (P. 
39.) (See also R. 47.) 
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supported by this Court's decision in Wasatch Mines Co. v. 
Hopkinson, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970). In Wasatch, the 
defendant's counterclaim asserted that he had received from the 
plaintiff a "right to the soil on the land, a profit a prendre, . 
, . ." Id. at 1010. The Court had before it a variety of 
documents relating to the parties' business agreements which 
involved the disputed interest in property at issue. Nonetheless 
the Wasatch Court affirmed the dismissal of defendant's 
counterclaim "since the documents d[id] not identify the grantor, 
the grantee, the interest granted, or a description of the 
boundaries in a manner sufficient to construe the instruments as 
a conveyance of an interest in land." Id. 
The transaction between RME and L.A. Young does not 
meet the standard set forth by this Court in Wasatch. There is 
no document for the Court to properly apply the Wasatch test. 
Again it bears mentioning that RME had no written agreement, yet 
it claims that an interest in land was transferred. With no 
written agreement, this Court cannot ascertain the kind of 
interest granted nor the boundaries of the alleged interest. 
Thus the Tax Commission, basing its decision on the totality of 
the circumstances, found that the sale of slag material was a 
purchase of tangible personal property and did not involved a 
nontaxable transfer of an interest in land. 
RME's argument also fails under the recent standard set 
forth in Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107 (Utah 
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App. 1990)/ for determining whether a conveyance of mineral 
interest exists in an agreement. In Heiner the court stated, 
"general principles governing the interpretation of contracts 
apply to documents conveying mineral interests. The cardinal 
rule is to give effect to the intentions of the parties . . . .M 
Id. at 110 (citations omitted). 
Under the Heiner standard, the fact that there was no 
written agreement between RME and L.A. Young supports the 
conclusion that a license was granted to L.A. Young rather than 
an interest in real property. "It is presumed that a parol 
agreement to impress property with a servitude is made with 
knowledge of the Statute of Frauds and is therefore a license not 
an easement*" Thompson on Real Property § 223, at 224 (1980 
Replacement), see also Mueller v. Keller, 164 N.E.2d 28 (111. 
1960). 
A mere oral understanding between RME and L.A. Young 
which permitted L.A. Young to remove slag does not rise to the 
level of an interest in land under the tests established by the 
Wasatch and Heiner courts. Thus the presumption of a license, 
under the facts of the present case, is appropriate and is 
supported by the facts. 
The record further supports the Tax Commission's 
decision that the transactions involved the sale of tangible 
personal property rather than a transfer of an interest in land. 
The question posed to RME at the Formal Hearing was whether its 
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slag pile was personalty or realty given that the slag material, 
a waste product, had been previously severed from real property 
during the mining process. Counsel for RME responded, "I don't 
think that there's any question that once the rock is severed 
it's personal property. I'm not going to sit here and tell you 
that it's real property at that point." (R. 47.) 
By RME's own admission, its argument is flawed. L.A. 
Young obtained an easement from Kennecott, (R. 103), which 
allowed L.A. Young access to the slag pile. RME claims that it 
granted an interest in real property to L.A. Young. However, 
L.A. Young only had oral permission to remove tangible personal 
property from RME's leasehold estate. This removal and sale of 
slag material does not amount to an interest in real property. 
L.A. Young had permission, properly labeled a license, from RME 
to remove slag material itself.2 
II. ROCKY MOUNTAIN ENERGY'S REQUIREMENT THAT L.A. 
YOUNG PAY FOR THE MATERIAL BY A TWO-PARTY 
CHECK ISSUED FROM UDOT DOES NOT EXEMPT THE 
UNDERLYING TRANSACTION BETWEEN ROCKY MOUNTAIN 
ENERGY AND L.A. YOUNG FROM TAXATION 
The payment procedure in this case required issuance of 
2
 Tanner Cos. v. Ariz. State Land Dept., 688 P.2d 1075 
(Ariz. App. 1984) required the court to interpret what interest 
was transferred when the lessee under a government lease entered 
into an oral agreement with a third party which authorized the 
latter to remove clay from lessee's leasehold for 25 cents per 
ton. The court held, "[t]he agreement between the parties here 
was nothing more than a license. A license is an authority or 
permission to do a particular act or series of acts upon the land 
of another without possessing any interest or estate in such 
land." Id. at 1085. 
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a two-party check payable to L.A. Young and RME as co-payees. 
"The warrants were received by L.A, Young from UDOT. The 
warrants were endorsed by L.A. Young and handed over to RME, 
which was entitled to the full check." (Stipulation of Facts, R. 
70.) The record of this case establishes that the method of 
payment was negotiated between RME and L.A. Young. Ici. RME 
insisted "that L.A. Young make arrangements with UDOT to make 
payment for the slag material by means of naming RME as a payee 
on UDOT's checks" along with L.A. Young. JEd. This manner of 
payment was arranged by RME because of its concern of L.A. 
Young's potential for nonpayment. 
The procedure of payment in the present case does not 
alter the underlying contracts to change a taxable sale of 
tangible personal property between RME and L.A. Young to a 
nontaxable sale of material between RME and the State of Utah. 
In this instance, it is necessary to look at the underlying 
substance of the agreements between RME, L.A. Young, and UDOT 
rather than the outwardly appearing form of payment. As the 
Hawaii Supreme court stated, "it is well settled that in 
determining tax liability, the substance of a transaction rather 
than its form governs." Matter of O.W. Ltd. Partnership, 668 
P.2d 56, 63 (Haw. 1983). 
The substance of the underlying agreement is that RME 
did not negotiate with UDOT. Thus, RME was not a party to the 
contract between L.A. Young and UDOT. Further, the record is 
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devoid of any invoices or other documentation of sale between RME 
and UDOT. From this it follows that RME did not sell slag 
material to UDOT. 
RME claims that the transactions involved a sale of 
personal property to the State. This claim is based on the sole 
fact that UDOT paid L.A. Young with a two-party check with RME 
designated as a co-payee. This claim is too narrow in focus, 
does not consider the totality of the circumstances and reaches 
an erroneous conclusion. 
The Tax Commission correctly saw the underlying 
substantive agreements as follows: first, a contract between RME 
and L.A. Young for slag material; and second, a contract between 
L.A. Young and UDOT for services and material. Furthermore, the 
Tax Commission looked beyond the formalities and the reasons 
payment was structured in the manner it was, and considered the 
substance of the transaction. Its determination that the 
transaction between RME and L.A. Young is not an exempt sale 
simply because payment was made by a UDOT check should be upheld. 
CONCLUSION 
The Tax Commission was correct in classifying the 
agreement between RME and L.A. Young as a license which gave L.A. 
Young the right to remove tangible personal property from RME's 
leasehold estate. Thus the Tax Commission was correct in 
upholding the assessment of sales tax on these sale transactions. 
Furthermore, the underlying arrangement between RME and 
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L.A. Young establishes that these transactions were taxable 
notwithstanding that RME received payment for the material by 
checks from UDOT made jointly payable to RME and L.A. Young. 
The Tax Commission respectfully requests that its 
decision be affirmed. 
DATED this ^> day of December, 1991 
/ 7£ 
.8 V
/^A'/i n By. 
BRIAN L. TARBET 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Utah State 
Tax Commission 
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ADDENDUM A 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN ENERGY CO., 
Petitioner, 
v. 
AUDITING DIVISION OF THE 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for oral arguments on November 19, 1990, pursuant to the 
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment. Paul F. Iwasaki, 
Presiding Officer, and Joe B. Pacheco, Commissioner, heard the 
matter for and on behalf of the Commission. Present and 
representing the Petitioner was James D. Douglass. Present and 
representing the Respondent was Brian L. Tarbet, Assistant 
Attorney General. 
Based upon the memoranda submitted, and oral arguments 
of the parties, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is sales tax. 
2. The audit period in question is from January 1, 
1984, through December 31, 1986. 
3. The Petitioner is a subsidiary of Union Pacific 
Corporation. 
ORDER 
Appeal No. 87-2039 
Appeal No. 87-20. 
4. The Petitioner is engaged in the processing and 
selling of slag material it extracts from a slag pile which is 
leased from Kennecott Copper Corporation in Magna, Utah. 
5. The Petitioner removes the slag by the use of a 
front-end loader, and loads the slag into trucks. The slag is 
transported to its facilities where the slag is crushed. The 
crushed slag is typically used for railroad ballast and fill 
material used in highway construction. 
6. The slag pile is approximately 175 acres in size, 
which rises to approximately 100 feet higher than the 
surrounding terrain. 
7. During the audit period, the Petitioner entered 
into an agreement with L.A. Young and Sons Construction Company 
to provide L.A, Young with slag to be used in the construction 
of a highway project that L.A. Young had agreed to perform for 
the Utah Department of Transportation (UDOT). At the choice of 
the construction company, the Petitioner would: (1) rip, 
doze, and load the material at a fixed price or; (2) the 
construction company could rip, doze, and load the material and 
pay the Petitioner 60 cents per ton. It was this second option 
that L.A. Young chose. 
8. Based upon the choice of the second option by 
L.A. Young, L.A. Young was permitted to remove the material 
from a designated site within the slag pile area. 
9. As the highway fill material was installed, UDOT 
paid for that fill material. Payment was made by warrants 
drawn on UDOT' s account and, at the request of the Petitioner, 
said warrants were mace pavable to the Petitioner and 1 A 
Appeal No. 87-20. 
Young as co-payees. This procedure was done at the request of 
the Petitioner to ensure payment by L.A. Young. 
10. As payments for the fill material were received 
by L.A. Young, L.A. Young endorsed the warrants and then 
submitted them to Petitioner as payment for the fill material 
purchased. 
11. An informal hearing was held on this matter on 
October 5, 1988. An informal decision was rendered by the 
Commission, dated February 21, 1989, which affirmed the 
assessment of the Respondent and denied the request of the 
Petitioner. Thereafter, the Petitioner filed its appeal 
requesting a formal hearing in this matter. 
12. Prior to formal hearing in this matter, the 
Petitioner requested that the matter be disposed of by way of 
its Motion for Summary Judgment, which formed the basis for 
this order. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
There is levied a tax on the purchaser for the amount 
paid or charged for retail sales of tangible personal property 
made within the state. "Tangible personal property" does not 
include real estate or any interest therein or improvements 
thereon. (Utah Code Ann. §§59-12-103 and §59-12-102.) 
Sales made to the state of Utah are exempt from tax if 
such property was purchased for use in the exercise of an 
essential governmental function. If the sale is paid for by 
warrant drawn upon the state Treasurer or the official 
disbursing agency of any political subdivision, a sale is 
considered as beina made to the state of Utah or its political 
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subdivisions and exempt from tax. (Utah State Tax Commission 
Administrative Rule R865-19-42S.) 
DECISION AND ORDER 
In the present case, the Petitioner argues that the 
purchases of the slag material by L.A. Young were exempt from 
sales tax for one of two alternative reasons: (1) Petitioner 
sold L.A. Young an interest in real property rather than a sale 
of tangible personal property, and thus was exempt from sales 
tax; or (2) the sale of the slag material was a sale to the 
state of Utah, and thus exempt from taxation. 
Turning to the Petitioner's first argument, the Tax 
Commission finds that the sale of the slag material to L.A. 
Young was a sale of tangible personal property and not the sale 
of an interest in land. There was no evidence presented by the 
Petitioner which would substantiate the Petitioner's claim that 
the parties to the contract intended the purchase agreement to 
constitute the sale of an interest in real property rather than 
the sale of the slag material as tangible personal property. 
Indeed, even the purchasing option offered to L.A. 
Young by the Petitioner would indicate that neither party 
intended this to be anything more than giving L.A. Young a 
license to enter onto the property to remove and extract the 
slag material. The Petitioner agrees that had L.A. Young 
chosen the first option, that is to have the Petitioner rip, 
doze, or load the material rather than performing those 
functions itself, the sale would constitute the sale of 
tangible personal property. Merely choosing the second option 
does not magically transform what is otherwise a sale of 
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tangible personal property into the sale of a real property 
right, nor does it change the character or nature of the slag 
removed. 
It should be noted that the Petitioner was not able to 
provide the Commission with a copy of any agreement between the 
Petitioner and L.A. Young which would in any way indicate that 
the transference of some real property right had indeed 
occurred. 
Turning next to the Petitioner's alternative argument, 
that the sale of the slag material was a sale to the state of 
Utah or one of its departments and thus exempt from taxation, 
the Tax Commission finds that this argument too is without 
merit. 
As correctly pointed out by the Respondent in its 
brief and its oral argument, the mere fact that the Petitioner 
was named as a co-payee on the warrants issued by UDOT does not 
necessarily lead to the conclusion that the sale of the slag 
material was a sale to the state of Utah or that a contractual 
relationship existed between the Petitioner and the state of 
Utah. 
As the Respondent points out, there were in fact two 
separate transactions conducted which must be viewed separately: 
1. The agreement between the Petitioner and L.A. 
Young; and 
2. The agreement between L.A. Young and the state of 
Utah. 
The first transaction was a transfer of tangible 
personal property from the Petitioner to L.A. Ycur.g, which was 
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subject to sales tax. The second transaction was the 
performance of services by L.A. Young for the state of Utah, 
with payment made by the state of Utah to L.A. Young. The fact 
that the Petitioner was named as a co-payee on the warrant as a 
measure of protection for the Petitioner does not establish a 
contractual relationship between the Petitioner and the state 
of Utah whereby the Petitioner was selling its product directly 
to the state. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission finds 
that the sale of the slag material to L.A. Young constituted 
the sale of tangible personal property to a party other than 
the state of Utah, or any of its departments, or any of its 
political subdivisions, and therefore, was a sale subject to 
sales tax. Therefore, the Tax Commission affirms its prior 
decision which affirmed the assessment of the Respondent and 
denies the motion of the Petitioner. Judgment is entered in 
favor of the Respondent. It is so ordered, 
DATED thi 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Lis \*5 day of J^\ Anxxo^X. , 1991. 
R. H. Hansen 
Chairman 
[&£ B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63~4 6b-l^*^-^> 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
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